This book proposes a normative theory of collective decision making, inspired by Jeremy Bentham but not including his utilitarian philosophy. The central proposal is that in designing democratic institutions one should reduce as much as possible the impact of self-interest, passion, prejudice, and bias on the decision makers, and then let the chips fall where they may. There is no independently defined good outcome that institutions can track, nor is there any way of reliably selecting good decision makers. In addition to a long initial chapter that surveys theories of collective decision making, notably social-choice theory, and a chapter expounding and discussing Bentham's views,.
Securities Against Misrule: Juries, Assemblies, Elections for free
Securities Against Misrule: Juries, Assemblies, Elections by Jon Elster ebook pdf epub mobi
Securities Against Misrule: Juries, Assemblies, Elections read online free book
No comments:
Post a Comment
Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.